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Reconstructing Unlawful and Dangerous Act 
Manslaughter 
 
Gavin D Leigh* 
Coventry University Law School 
 
Abstract 
In the last three decades unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter has been subject 
to contradictory recommendations for reform. The debate has been dominated in that 
time by disagreement over the change of normative position, considered when 
attempting to justify liability for causing death in the commission of a crime with the 
objective risk of injury in the circumstances. The article suggests that this current 
definition of unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter is defensible if appropriately 
interpreted by the Supreme Court. The interpretation requires an intended unlawful 
act and the foreseeable risk of injury from a specific circumstance known to the 
defendant before the unlawful act. 
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Introduction 
Unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter has been deconstructed by judges and 
academics, but never reconstructed in a satisfactory form. The Court of Appeal’s 
recent view,1 supporting Andrew Ashworth’s,2 is that wide-ranging consultation and 
                                                     
* I thank Jeremy Horder, Barry Mitchell and David Ormerod for their comments on earlier drafts. 
1 R v JF and NE [2015] EWCA Crim 351; [2015] All ER (D) 117 (Mar) at [33] [JF and NE]. 
2 A. Ashworth, ‘Case Comment’ [2013] 4 Crim LR 335 at 337. 
legislation is the way forward. However, there have been two contradictory proposals 
for reform from the Law Commission in the last three decades alone. This article will 
suggest that the current definition, as laid down in D.P.P. v. Newbury and Jones,3 can 
be defended by the idea that the actus reus elements of the unlawful act should be 
intended by the defendant and that the foreseeable injury should exist before the 
crime. 
Unlawful act manslaughter has been described as ‘illogical’,4 ‘unattractive’,5 
and ‘antiquated’.6 It involves the attribution of criminal liability for causing death in the 
commission of a crime,7 provided there was the foreseeable risk of bodily harm, which 
need not be serious harm,8 in all the circumstances that were known to the defendant.9 
This objective test takes no account of the defendant’s capacity to foresee what the 
reasonable person would have foreseen.10 Furthermore, the degree of foreseeable 
risk required is unclear.11 The crime must be a more than minimal cause of death,12 
but need not be directed at the victim.13 
The main criticism of unlawful act manslaughter has been its constructive 
nature. This is reflected in the gap between the degree of foreseeable harm required 
and the death caused, which has created arguments about whether the defendant 
should be held liable for causing a death that is so dependent on luck. This can also 
                                                     
3 DPP v Newbury and Jones [1977] AC 500 (HL) [Newbury and Jones]. 
4 R v Creamer [1966] 1 QB 72 (CCA) at 82 (Lord Parker C.J.). 
5 R v Lowe [1973] QB 702 (CA) at 709 (Phillimore L.J.) [Lowe]. 
6 R v Scarlett (1994) 98 Cr App R 290 (CA) at 291 (Beldam L.J.) [Scarlett]. 
7 An omission is insufficient. A deliberate omission should be sufficient. See Lowe, above n. 5. Cf. R v 
Gibbons and Proctor (1918) 13 Cr App R 134 (CCA). 
8 See Newbury and Jones, above n. 3. 
9 R v Watson [1989] Crim LR 733 (CA) [Watson]. 
10 Cf. R v Creighton [1993] 3 SCR 3 (SCC) at 61 (McLachlin J.): ‘considerations of principle and policy 
dictate the maintenance of a single, uniform legal standard of care for such offences, subject to one 
exception: incapacity to appreciate the nature of the risk which the activity in question entails.’ 
11 R v Larkin [1943] 1 All ER 217 (CCA) [Larkin] at 219: ‘an act which is likely to injure another person’. 
Cf. R v Carey [2006] EWCA Crim 17; [2006] All ER (D) 189 (Jan) at [31] (Dyson LJ): ‘Church only 
requires a risk of some harm resulting.’ Italics added. 
12 R v Cato [1976] 1 All ER 260 (CA). 
13 Attorney General’s Reference (No.3 of 1994) [1998] AC 245 (HL). 
be seen in the lack of a clearly foreseeable relationship between some crimes against 
property and the death caused. In light of the latter point, the test of dangerousness 
performs the task of distinguishing between a conviction for the unlawful act and a 
conviction for unlawful act manslaughter. 
Much of the debate surrounding unlawful act manslaughter has centred on the 
discrepancy between the degree of harm risked and the harm actually caused by the 
defendant. Some have argued that this means of proving manslaughter could be 
justified by carrying out an act with the intent to cause bodily harm, or at least an 
‘attack’, which involves an injurious offence against the person.14 Horder defended the 
idea that unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter should only be based on an act 
with the intent to cause bodily harm. He did this through his argument that the moral 
and legal justification for unlawful act manslaughter is the law’s respect for ‘physical 
integrity’ and its indivisibility from the victim’s ‘life force’.15 This is his answer to the so-
called change of normative position involved in being held responsible for the 
unforeseen death caused by the dangerous crime. This has been the centre ground 
of the debate regarding unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter in the last three 
decades and suggests that the defendant should be held responsible for the resultant 
death, even if it was unforeseen, because knowingly committing crime, or ‘certain risky 
crimes’, opens up the defendant to liability for prohibited results beyond those intended 
or foreseen.16 This implicates the defendant in what has been termed ‘moral luck’,17 
                                                     
14 C. M. V. Clarkson, ‘Context and Culpability in Involuntary Manslaughter’ in A. Ashworth and B. 
Mitchell (eds), Rethinking English Homicide Law (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2000) 133 at 160. 
15 J. Horder, ‘Violating Physical Integrity: Manslaughter by Intentional Attack’ in Homicide and the 
Politics of Law Reform (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2012) 143. 
16 J. Gardner, ‘Rationality and the Rule of Law in Offences Against the Person’ (1994) 53 CLJ 502 at 
509. 
17 T. Nagel, Moral Luck (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1979) 26: ‘Where a significant aspect 
of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that 
respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck.’ 
which involves responsibility for an accidental death that is arguably beyond the 
control of the defendant. 
These issues could be overcome by concentrating on the test of 
dangerousness, which in practice takes two forms. The first is when the unlawful act 
does not require recklessness as to injury, rendering the test objective. The second is 
when the unlawful act can be proven by recklessness as to some injury and the test 
is actually satisfied by the defendant’s subjective risk-taking.18 In the first, unlike in the 
second test, there is no opportunity to avoid creating the risk of injury, unless the 
circumstances known before the crime is committed suggest there is the foreseeable 
risk of injury. This is illustrated by the following example. In the course of committing 
a burglary, the defendant accidentally disturbs a young child, who is sleeping upstairs 
in a bedroom. The child runs away from the defendant and, during this ‘burglarious 
intrusion’,19 the defendant watching the events unfold would foresee the risk of injury, 
but that risk of injury has already been created and cannot be avoided on the facts. If 
the child falls down the stairs and dies, the defendant could be convicted of unlawful 
and dangerous act manslaughter on the basis of a continuing unlawful act. This article 
will suggest that a conviction for unlawful act manslaughter should depend on the 
foreseeable risk of injury from the circumstances known before the commission of the 
crime, unless recklessness as to some injury suffices for the unlawful act. Narrowing 
the law to a specific and dangerous circumstance, known before the commission of a 
crime, would allow the defendant the opportunity to avoid a conviction for unlawful act 
manslaughter and lessen the impact of luck on criminal liability. The development of 
the case law since Newbury and Jones has allowed for the risk of injury to arise at any 
                                                     
18 See Horder, above n. 15 at 152. 
19 See Watson, above n. 9 at 733 (Lord Lane C.J.). 
time during the continuing circumstances of the crime. This change in the test of 
dangerousness has never been approved at the highest appellate level. 
These issues could also be overcome by concentrating on the meaning of an 
intentional unlawful act as defined in Newbury and Jones. There is historical authority 
for a version of unlawful act manslaughter defined by an intention to cause bodily 
harm. Moreover, it makes no sense to interpret intentional in this context as voluntary 
given that R. v. Lamb,20 approved by Newbury and Jones, is unclear whether an 
intended unlawful act or its mens rea is required. Seen in this light, unlawful and 
dangerous act manslaughter is not a constructive crime. It should not need proof of a 
crime, but an intended criminal act. Even if recklessness is enough to prove the crime, 
it should be insufficient for unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter. Crucially, an 
intention to commit the actus reus elements of the unlawful act lessens the impact of 
moral luck on unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter. The distinction between 
intention and recklessness, in terms of the relationship with luck, should depend on 
the idea that the reliance on luck involved in the former is inextricably bound up in (at 
least one of) the defendant’s reasons for acting. This should be factored into his 
practical attitude when he intends an outcome such as bodily harm, because it is 
dependent on luck. 
By concentrating on the test of dangerousness and the mens rea for the 
unlawful act, it will be seen that an unlawful act which does not require recklessness 
as to some injury, and an unlawful act that can be proven by recklessness as to some 
injury, could be justified by a different interpretation of unlawful and dangerous act 
manslaughter. This would address the gap between the degree of foreseeable harm 
                                                     
20 R v Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981 [Lamb]. 
required and the resultant death. It would also explain the lack of a foreseeable 
relationship between some unlawful acts and the death caused. 
 
The change of normative position 
Before understanding why the dangerous circumstances of the unlawful act should be 
foreseeable before the crime has begun, and why there should be an intention to 
commit the actus reus elements of the unlawful act, it will be necessary to understand 
why the mainstream debate regarding unlawful act manslaughter and luck has failed 
to reach a satisfactory conclusion. The law’s respect for physical integrity was meant 
to explain the change of normative position, which has been at the centre of the debate 
surrounding unlawful act manslaughter for the last three decades. John Gardner 
initially authored the phrase, although he later made clear that it was not a possible 
justification of liability for causing consequences beyond those intended or foreseen,21 
but an attempt to make this constructive form of liability comprehensible.22 His view 
was that causing death, or killing, is the basic moral wrong: the rule of law requires 
notice of prospective liability, but that does not mean that the harm foreseen has to be 
co-extensive with the harm caused,23 provided there is an element of notice involved, 
which is more efficient where the unlawful act requires intention or recklessness.24 For 
Ashworth, however, ‘fair warning of an unfair rule does not turn it into a fair rule’.25 
                                                     
21 Cf. G. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, S. W. Dyde tr. (George Bell & Sons: London, 1896) 115–
116: ‘In acting I must expose myself to misfortune; that also has a right to me, and is the manifestation 
of my own will.’ 
22 J. Gardner, ‘Reply to Critics’ in John Gardner (ed.), Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the 
Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007) 239 at 247: ‘Elsewhere, to be more 
exact, I have argued (against Kant) that acting with bad results (and irrespective of fault) is the basic or 
elementary type of moral wrongdoing.’ 
23 Ibid. at 248. 
24 J. Gardner, ‘Introduction by John Gardner’ in H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, Essays 
in the Philosophy of Law, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008) xiii at xlv. 
25 A. Ashworth, ‘A Change of Normative Position: Determining the Contours of Culpability in Criminal 
Law’ (2008) 11 New Crim L Rev 232 at 247. 
From this perspective, the harm contemplated and that caused should always 
correspond, through intended or risked consequences,26 even if the risk was only 
foreseeable and was not actually foreseen.27 Some have suggested that this could be 
determined by statistics, but acknowledge that this is a matter of common 
experience.28 In this way, moral luck would not play a part in the criminal law. 
The change of normative position had involved the argument that an intended 
crime justifies liability for a resultant unforeseen death, subject to certain limitations: 
seemingly, that it was a crime of violence; and that the death was not seen as 
disproportionate in some way to the degree of bodily harm intended.29 But this was 
criticised by Ashworth on the grounds that the argument was reliant on the normative 
value of intention, which had not been fully justified,30 that those crimes of violence 
were liable to extension on policy grounds,31 and that proportionality was a vague 
concept.32 As a response, Horder reconceived his approach to entail the law’s respect 
for victims’ physical integrity, which was said to be inseparable from their ‘life force’, 
provided that actual bodily harm was intended as an end or a means to an end.33 It is 
clear, therefore, that intention remains a significant part of this possible justification for 
a change of normative position. 
One argument which supports Horder’s approach is that the bad luck involved 
in, for example, one-punch manslaughter, is not unrelated to the defendant’s 
culpability. This can be seen as a matter of death being ‘strictly’ foreseeable,34 or as 
                                                     
26 Ibid. at 236. 
27 V. Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005) 95. 
28 B. Mitchell, ‘Minding the Gap in Unlawful and Dangerous Act Manslaughter: A Moral Defence of One-
punch Killers’ (2008) 72 J Crim L 537 at 542. Cf. Ashworth, above n. 25 at 252. 
29 J. Horder, ‘Two Histories and Four Hidden Principles of Mens Rea’ (1997) 113(Jan) LQR 95, 96. 
30 Above n. 25 at 255. 
31 Ibid. at 244. 
32 Ibid. at 252. 
33 Above n. 15. 
34 B. Mitchell, ‘More Thoughts about Unlawful and Dangerous Act Manslaughter and the One-punch 
Killer’ [2009] Crim LR 502 at 503. 
the defendant having brought about his own, related, luck; the luck is not random in 
the sense that it would be if the defendant had set out to cause a different kind of crime 
from that caused.35 Furthermore, there is a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
luck.36 Namely, intrinsic luck changes D’s normative position because the defendant’s 
culpable actions brought about the bad luck, making them relevant to D’s moral luck; 
extrinsic luck demonstrates no foreseeable relationship between the defendant’s 
culpability and the bad luck caused. However, this argument can be made out on the 
basis of intention or recklessness. 
Some consider that intrinsic luck has wider implications for the rule of law 
arguments discussed by Gardner and Ashworth. Provided the rationale for unlawful 
act manslaughter is at least partly based on intrinsic luck, it can be argued that the 
defendant has been given fair warning of liability for the accidental death: the unlawful 
and dangerous act is not only a means of putting the defendant on notice of impending 
liability, but indicates to the defendant that the act is wrong because it can cause 
death.37 Another question remains, however, regarding the defendant’s capacity not 
only to recognise that risk but to avoid it. If there is an opportunity to avoid the 
commission of an unlawful and dangerous act then, to some extent, the focus of the 
debate has been misplaced. On the basis that there is a risk of death every time there 
is the risk of injury,38 some traction could be gained in concentrating on the defendant’s 
ability to foresee and avoid creating the risk, which can be controlled, rather than the 
subsequent result of creating the risk, which cannot. 
 
                                                     
35 A. P. Simester et al., Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law, Theory and Doctrine, 5th edn (Hart 
Publishing: Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2013) 197–198. 
36 B. Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1981) 25–26. 
37 See A. P. Simester et al., above n. 35 at 200. 
38 Cf. Creighton, above n. 10 at 52 (McLachlin J.): ‘Wherever there is a risk of harm, there is also a 
practical risk that some victims may die as a result of the harm.’ 
The foreseeable risk of injury from a specific circumstance known to the 
defendant before the unlawful act 
A defendant’s ability to foresee the risk of injury would not explain how culpability is 
derived from dangerousness, even if the objective test took account of the defendant’s 
capacity to recognise the risk and required the relevant risk to be a likely risk of injury 
in the circumstances. This is because culpability is based on creating the risk of injury, 
which is different from the risk eventuating. When that risk arises in the course of an 
unlawful act, the bystander might recognise that the risk has been created, but whether 
it eventuates is a matter of chance and by this time, moreover, the risk-creation cannot 
be avoided. This is not an issue for unlawful acts that can be proven by recklessness 
as to some injury, because dangerousness is supplanted by the defendant’s 
subjective recognition of the risk involved, which means there is an opportunity to 
avoid the risk-creation at the appropriate time. It is an issue, however, for unlawful acts 
that do not require recklessness as to some injury, which can be addressed by 
accepting that unlawful and dangerous acts are only dangerous by virtue of specific 
circumstances. Moreover, in order to avoid the risk-creation, those circumstances 
should be foreseeable before the unlawful and dangerous act is committed. Only by 
ensuring that the unlawful and dangerous act can be foreseen and avoided is it fair to 
hold the defendant liable for the death caused. Without a specific foreseeable and 
avoidable risk manslaughter is unfair. This can be seen by comparing unlawful and 
dangerous acts. 
For example, on the facts of Arobieke,39 D assaulted V by following him to a 
railway station and searching for him on a train.40 In attempting to escape V crossed 
                                                     
39 R v Arobieke [1988] Crim LR 314 (CA). 
40 The force V apprehended was insufficiently imminent according to the law at the time and the 
manslaughter conviction was quashed. Cf. R v Ireland, Burstow [1998] AC 147 (HL).  
a live track and was electrocuted. The unlawful act, on the basis that there was an 
assault, became dangerous, but a bystander would not have reasonably foreseen the 
injury and it was V’s conduct that created the risk of injury in the circumstances. This 
might suffice as a legal cause of the death, as V’s conduct could be seen as non-
voluntary,41 but by the time a bystander would have recognised the risk of injury, from 
crossing the track, it was too late to avoid it. The relevant risk had already been 
created. The assault can be said to be a continuing unlawful act, which became 
dangerous, as the apprehension of unlawful personal violence might have been the 
cause of the victim’s conduct. Contrast this with Lewis,42 where D had assaulted V by 
chasing him into oncoming traffic. The ground of appeal was based on causation, but 
the conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeal.43 The assault was held to be 
dangerous in the circumstances and this would have been obvious to a bystander, as 
it had been to several witnesses who saw D chase V into and across the road. Before 
the risk of injury was created by that criminal act, it would have been obvious that it 
would create the risk of some harm. Although an assault is not inherently dangerous, 
this was an unlawful and dangerous act that was foreseeable and avoidable before it 
began. 
The leading case of Newbury and Jones was ostensibly based on an unlawful 
and dangerous act of criminal damage, although the act was not identified by the 
House of Lords. The defendants had thrown part of a paving stone from a bridge as a 
train was about to reach them. It broke a window on the train and killed the guard. This 
                                                     
41 R v Kennedy (No.2) [2007] UKHL 38; [2008] 1 AC 269 [Kennedy]. It is clear from this judgment that 
the first question, where V’s conduct is concerned, is whether a voluntary act has broken the chain of 
causation. This conduct can be seen as non-voluntary, from apprehension of the battery, but not 
reasonably foreseeable. 
42 R v Lewis [2010] EWCA Crim 151. 
43 The chain of causation was not broken by the victim’s conduct, because it was held to have been 
reasonably foreseeable. Cf. R v Williams [1992] 2 All ER 183 (CA). 
act was dangerous in the circumstances, inasmuch as it created the risk of injury to 
anyone on the train. It can be seen as dangerous before the unlawful act of criminal 
damage had been committed. There was, therefore, an opportunity for the fifteen-
year-old boys to avoid creating the relevant risk, assuming that they had the capacity 
to recognise the risk. This can be compared with JF and NE, where the appellants, 
who had been fourteen-and-a-half and sixteen years old at the time, set fire to a duvet 
in the unlit basement of a derelict building, causing the death of a homeless person 
from the inhalation of carbon monoxide created by the acrid smoke of a nearby tyre in 
under five minutes. One of the defendants seemingly lacked the capacity to recognise 
the risk of injury from the arson: evidence was adduced that he had the mental age of 
a six-year-old. Moreover, on the facts, there was no opportunity to avoid the risk-
creation. From the perspective of a bystander, before the fire was started, there was 
no risk of injury to anyone in the known circumstances. It was only once the fire had 
spread to the tyre and caused the smoke to fill the basement that an adult might have 
recognised the risk of injury to someone; by that time the risk had already been created 
and could not be avoided. It might be argued that arson is an inherently dangerous 
crime,44 but it is submitted that the Court of Appeal’s approach to foreseeability in 
cases of unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter is wrong: dangerousness depends 
on specific circumstances.45 
In Watson, a burglar broke into a home in which a frail and elderly person lived. 
The victim subsequently died of a heart attack and the conviction was quashed on the 
grounds of lack of causation. The Court of Appeal held that ‘the appellant’s unlawful 
                                                     
44 Cf. Horder, above n. 15 at 143: ‘killing by intentionally attacking V’s physical integrity is … not to make 
an implicit claim that attacks on physical integrity are more dangerous to life than attacks on property. 
That may be a false claim, for example, in cases of arson.’ 
45 Cf. R v M(J) [2012] EWCA Crim 2293; [2013] 1 WLR 1083 (Lord Judge C.J.) at 1089: ‘a requirement 
that the bystander must appreciate the “sort” of injury which might occur undermines the “some” harm 
principle explained in R v Church’. 
act comprised the whole of the burglarious intrusion’.46 But the significant issue, in 
Watson, is that the creation of risk could not have been avoided. The crime was not 
dangerous in the circumstances known beforehand. By the time the risk was 
foreseeable to a bystander, it had already been created. Even if the bystander was 
imbued with the defendant’s knowledge it would not have helped: Watson did not know 
of the victim’s frailty and age until it was too late. Therefore, if there was nothing in the 
circumstances to indicate that the occupant would be frail and elderly, Watson could 
not have avoided a manslaughter conviction by avoiding an unlawful and dangerous 
act. By way of comparison, in Bristow, the unlawful act was conspiracy to burgle.47 
The burglars had targeted some vehicles to steal and the evidence suggested that the 
deceased was run over in his attempt to intervene. The Crown relied on the fact that 
the workshop, from which a vehicle was stolen, was close to the farmhouse in which 
the deceased lived. It was said that the ‘burglary would involve the use of heavy 
vehicles ... at night [which] would have to manoeuvre in a confined space.’48 Counsel 
for the appellants argued that the trial ‘judge had been wrong to focus on the risk of 
harm prior to the burglary’,49 and that ‘the offence did not become dangerous until a 
car began to be driven dangerously’.50 Treacy, L.J., held that there: 
 
was a clear possibility of intervention by someone living in the residential part 
of the farm, and the circumstances were such that a jury could find that a risk 
of danger of causing some injury was created.51 
                                                     
46 Above n. 9. The defendants abused the victim verbally, which could have been an assault. 
47 R v Bristow (Terrence) & Ors [2013] EWCA Crim 1540; [2013] All ER (D) 109 (Sep) at [10] (Treacy 
L.J.) [Bristow]. This placed emphasis on the circumstances known beforehand. 
48 Ibid. at [7] (Treacy L.J.). 
49 Ibid. at [26] (Treacy L.J.). 
50 Ibid. at [27] (Treacy L.J.). 
51 Ibid. at [30]. 
 Specifically, his Lordship thought that this was: 
 
not a case like Dawson or Watson where the circumstances demonstrating the 
risk of harm to the occupier of property did not arise until a point during the 
burglary or at all.52 
 
In R. v. Dawson, it was noted that the bystander has the same knowledge as the 
defendant watching the events unfold and no more.53 The objective person is no more 
able to avoid the risk of injury arising from circumstances beyond their control, after 
the unlawful act has begun, than the defendant is. It was recognised, in Bristow, that 
unlawful act manslaughter is committed ‘in circumstances rendering it a dangerous 
act’.54 It can be argued that these circumstances should always be foreseeable before 
the unlawful and dangerous act is committed. This represents an extension of J.C. 
Smith’s view that the reasonable bystander cannot be seen as ‘having come on the 
scene at the moment of the fatal act with no knowledge of any earlier events.’55 
Furthermore, Ashworth has noted similar implications for negligence.56 In Bristow the 
risk of injury was created by the dangerous circumstances but was foreseeable and 
avoidable before it happened. 
 
 
                                                     
52 Ibid. at [34]. 
53 R v Dawson (1985) Cr App R 150 (CA) at 157 (Watkins L.J.) [Dawson]. 
54 Above n. 47 at [32] (Treacy L.J.). 
55 J. C. Smith, ‘Case Comment’ [1989] Crim LR 730 at 732. 
56 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th edn (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2006) 193: ‘The 
enquiry into capacity and opportunity necessitated by negligence liability widens the time-frame of the 
criminal law, giving precedence to the doctrine of prior fault over the principle of contemporaneity.’ 
An intended unlawful act 
Newbury and Jones relied on Church,57 which in turn had relied on Larkin for its 
definition of unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter. The court in Larkin relied on: 
 
propositions of law … to be found in many old cases, and … summed up quite 
accurately in ARCHBOLD’S CRIMINAL PLEADING, 30th Edn., at pp. 900-903, 
where the authorities are given.58 
 
Archbold notes, however, under ‘seeming exceptions … to the above rule’,59 where 
manslaughter is discussed: 
 
Where an act … itself lawful is at the same time dangerous, it must appear, in 
order to render an unintentional homicide from it excusable, that the party … 
used such a degree of caution as to make it improbable that any danger or 
injury should arise from it to others.60 
 
Under the same section, and immediately afterwards, it reads: ‘Where a dangerous 
and unlawful act is done, even in sport, if death results it is manslaughter: e.g. … 
Fenton’.61 The implications of these two statements are: (a) that a dangerous act 
involves a probable risk of injury; and (b) that R v. Fenton involved a risk of probable 
                                                     
57 R v Church [1966] 1 QB 59 (CCA) [Church]. 
58 Above n. 11. 
59 J. F. Archbold, R. E. Ross & M. Turner, A Summary of the Law relative to Pleading and Evidence in 
Criminal Cases, 30th edn (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 1938) 902. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
injury.62 There is reason to argue, therefore, that dangerousness was not imposed on 
unlawful act manslaughter in Larkin. 
 The presumption that a person intended the natural and probable 
consequences of his or her actions meant that there was nothing to choose between 
intention and a voluntary act when Fenton was decided. A review of historical sources 
tends to suggest that there was at least a version of unlawful act manslaughter defined 
by an act intended to cause injury.63 
An example of manslaughter by an act intended to cause injury is Matthew 
Kelly,64 which was said to disclose ‘a clear case of manslaughter’65 and involved 
evidence: 
 
that the prisoner struck with his fist, and that the deceased fell from the blow 
upon the piece of brick, and that the fall upon the brick was the cause of the 
death.66 
 
This variety of unlawful act manslaughter was separately acknowledged in Russell’s 
treatise for practitioners: 
 
any one [sic] who voluntarily, knowingly, and unlawfully, intends hurt to the 
person of another, though he intend not death, yet, if death ensue, is guilty of 
murder or manslaughter, according to the circumstances of the nature of the 
                                                     
62 Fenton’s and Others’ Case (1830) 1 Lewin 179; 168 ER 1004 [Fenton]. 
63 See Horder, above n. 15 at 140–141. Horder argued that this evolved into unlawful and dangerous 
act manslaughter. 
64 R v Matthew Kelly (1825) 1 Mood 113; 168 ER 1206. 
65 Ibid. at 113. 
66 Ibid. at 113–114. 
instrument used, and the manner of using it, as calculated to produce great 
bodily harm or not.67 
 
Thomas Starkie, in dissenting from the Criminal Law Commissioners’ 
recommendation that manslaughter by negligence could cover intentional violence 
unlikely to kill,68 recognised manslaughter by an act intended to cause injury as law,69 
relying on Foster’s definition.70 In evidence to the Select Committee on the Homicide 
Law Amendment Bill 1874, Bramwell, B., acknowledged manslaughter by an act 
intended to cause injury as a separate means of proving unlawful act manslaughter, 
describing it as ‘slight violence which no man would expect would kill’.71 By the end of 
the nineteenth century, Stephen defined it separately, in the same way as Foster.72 In 
Doherty,73 the prisoner was indicted for murder and the direction in which Doherty shot 
was disputed. Stephen, J., directed the jury that, in the event of a manslaughter 
conviction, they specify ‘manslaughter by violence wilfully inflicted, or by culpable 
negligence’.74 By the beginning of the twentieth century, Kenny acknowledged that 
unlawful act manslaughter could be independently proven as follows: 
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Where some trivial blow is struck, with the intention of producing mere 
momentary pain, but death unexpectedly results from it, then, if it is an unlawful 
blow, the striker will be guilty of manslaughter.75 
 
In the light of these sources, it is arguable that the interpretation of the authorities 
relied on in Larkin was not the only possible interpretation and, as Sir Richard Buxton 
has argued, there was a version of manslaughter defined by an act intended to cause 
injury.76 Therefore Lord Salmon, in Newbury and Jones, was correct to approve of 
Lamb as an authority for a ‘guilty mind’.77 His Lordship’s decision that the defendant 
need only show ‘an intention to do the acts which constitute the crime’ is not 
completely reflective of unlawful act manslaughter as it had been understood.78 As 
unlawful act manslaughter seems to have been defined as a voluntary, unlawful, and 
dangerous act, or an act intended to cause injury, which caused death,79 it is open to 
the Supreme Court to interpret unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter as requiring 
an intended, unlawful, and dangerous act causing death. 
 There are arguments based on the rule of law and the normative value of 
intention for relying on an intended, unlawful, and dangerous act rather than simply an 
intentional one, or one in which the unlawful and dangerous act was committed 
recklessly. This authority depends on intention as an end or a means to an end. First, 
it could not be clearer to the defendant that there is the risk of conviction for a crime 
when the criminal threshold is deliberately crossed and, in combination with a 
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foreseeable risk of injury at that moment, there is sufficient notice that the defendant 
may be convicted of a crime caused by the risk of injury. This, for some, would not be 
any more compelling than Gardner’s rule of law argument in relation to due notice. 
Second, however, the intended commission of the actus reus elements of a criminal 
act makes the defendant dependent on luck, at least in bringing about the result 
elements intended. In association with the foreseeable risk of injury at that moment, it 
is reasonable to argue that the defendant has a different relationship with luck because 
of intention. Therefore, the consequences involved in throwing a stone at a 
greenhouse with the intention of breaking the window can fairly be attributed to the 
defendant who causes the death of someone known to be kneeling close by.80 If the 
defendant broke the window by voluntarily or recklessly throwing the stone, there was 
no dependence on luck. 
For many instances of unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter the intention 
to cause bodily harm renders the objective test of dangerousness unnecessary, 
because the defendant recognises and creates the risk of some harm. It is, in fact, his 
aim or purpose or at least a means to that end. There is, therefore, no difficulty with 
avoiding the risk-creation. On the contrary, the defendant consciously creates the risk 
of injury. The only issue is the gap between the degree of harm intended and that 
caused. In relation to one-punch manslaughter, the defendant’s conduct might reveal 
an intention to cause ABH, which can fulfil the test of dangerousness. The defendant 
has brought about the bad luck, by committing a crime with the risk of some harm and 
the bad luck is intrinsic to that action. The intended action displays an attitude of 
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‘pursuit’,81 which is a cognitive and affective state of mind that reveals dependence on 
luck, without which the defendant would fail to bring about the intended degree of harm 
and which leads to the bad luck associated with the accidental death. This represents 
an extension of Duff’s distinction between endangerments and attacks, the latter of 
which Horder relies on for the interest in physical integrity involved in his ‘pure’ version 
of unlawful act manslaughter.82 
The significance of an attack, according to Duff, lies in the ‘practical hostility 
towards the interest at which it is directed’.83 This builds on the idea that ‘the non-
occurrence of the harm marks the failure of the enterprise.’84 This is clearly not the 
case with endangerment where, although the defendant could be said to be practically 
indifferent in the sense that his conduct does not display the kind of respect for the 
reasons against acting that it should, the defendant could plausibly claim to be relieved 
that his exposure of the interest to the risk of harm for whatever reason did not 
eventuate in harm.85 This draws an apparent distinction in the criminal law between, 
on the one hand, risk-taking such as recklessness and, on the other, intention. The 
intention to harm means the defendant has his own reason for acting and that this is 
wrong: he believes that by attacking the interest he will cause harm (and this is at least 
one reason for which he acts).86 On this basis, the luck involved in an attack is integral 
to the attack and, therefore, to the defendant’s culpability. This luck is not simply 
intrinsic, it is inextricably bound up in (at least one of) the defendant’s reasons for 
acting and should be factored into his practical attitude when he pursues an outcome 
                                                     
81 A. Kenny, Freewill and Responsibility (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd: London, Henley and Boston, 
1978) 46. 
82 Above n. 15 at 141. 
83 R. A. Duff, Answering for Crime (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2007) 151. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
that is dependent on luck. Therefore, the defendant does not simply bring the bad luck 
on himself. There is a clear difference between an unlucky result that is caused by his 
culpable actions and one which is also the outcome of reliance on luck. 
Duff’s attack or endangerment distinction has been criticised by Kimberly 
Kessler Ferzan, for whom this distinction is a difference in degree and not in kind, 
especially as Duff included an intention to expose to a risk in his understanding of an 
attack, which she identifies as an extreme version of indifference.87 An intention to 
expose to a risk is, by its nature, not dependent on luck to bring about a result. As was 
acknowledged above, an intended attack includes the creation of a risk, but it is not 
simply on a spectrum of recklessness or ‘unjustifiably imposing risks for the attainment 
of some possible end’.88 
 
Reform 
In its most recent recommendation, the Law Commission defined ‘criminal act 
manslaughter’ as: 
 
‘killing another person (a) through the commission of a criminal act intended by 
the defendant to cause injury, or (b) through the commission of a criminal act 
that the defendant was aware involved a serious risk of causing some injury’.89 
 
There was some doubt whether intention or subjective recklessness as to injury was 
required for unlawful act manslaughter, before its rejection in Newbury and Jones.90 
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Furthermore, a serious risk was not meant to denote a likely risk.91 This is in line with 
the degree of risk involved in establishing recklessness more generally.92 There is 
nothing wrong, however, with an objective risk of injury, provided that risk is a serious 
and obvious one, which takes account of capacity to some extent, as with the objective 
test for gross negligence manslaughter.93 A likely risk can be seen as reasonably 
foreseeable if it is not impossible for the defendant to recognise the risk. Newbury and 
Jones was decided on the basis of the risk foreseeable to all sober and reasonable 
people. This confirmed the test approved in Church. The courts should assess the 
foreseeable risk of injury from circumstances known to the defendant before the crime 
began, because the risk from these circumstances might have been foreseeable to 
the defendant and, crucially, because the defendant could therefore have avoided 
committing an unlawful and dangerous act. If, however, the specific circumstance that 
renders the crime dangerous does not exist and is not foreseeable until the crime has 
begun, conviction of unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter can be a matter of 
luck. Therefore, in following Newbury and Jones, dangerousness should be 
ascertained before the defendant committed the unlawful act. 
 There are arguments for including capacity in the interpretation of 
dangerousness, when recklessness as to injury does not suffice for the unlawful act. 
This is because the objective form of dangerousness, as with other objective forms of 
liability, has been seen as including the defendant’s capacity to recognise risks, at 
least to some extent. The inclusion of the defendant’s conditions, which render it 
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impossible for the defendant to recognise the risk, does not make the test of 
dangerousness redundant, but it does explain why the defendant cannot foresee what 
the sober and reasonable person would foresee. It means that the defendant has a 
fair opportunity to avoid a conviction for unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter. It 
is also necessary, with a view to taking that opportunity, that the defendant has the 
physical and mental capacity to recognise the risk as dangerous and to avoid it.94 If it 
is impossible for defendants to foresee and avoid the risk-creation, which ‘all sober 
and reasonable people would inevitably recognise’,95 then they should not be held 
liable for it. In JF and NE, it was surely impossible for a defendant with the mental age 
of a six-year-old to recognise the risk of bodily harm involved in the circumstances. 
Mental or physical incapacity to recognise a risk could include an illiterate defendant 
who, for example, cannot read a warning on a bottle of nitroglycerine, provided he is 
not responsible for his illiteracy causing harm.96 
 
Conclusion 
It has become clear that by determining dangerousness before the unlawful act 
begins, whether that be through an inherently dangerous crime, for which 
recklessness as to some injury suffices, or a crime that is dangerous because of its 
circumstances, the relationship between the death caused and the unlawful act 
intended can be defended. If there is a change to the norm, in the change of normative 
position, it is found in the due notice given by the specific risk of injury before the 
criminal threshold is crossed, in combination with the change in relationship to luck 
                                                     
94 H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, Essays in the Philosophy of Law in John Gardner (ed.), 
2nd edn (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 154: ‘If our conditions of liability are invariant and not 
flexible, i.e. if they are not adjusted to the capacities of the accused, then some individuals will be held 
liable for negligence though they could not have helped their failure to comply with the standard.’ 
95 See Church, above n. 57 at 70 (Edmund Davies J.). Italics added. 
96 See Creighton, above n. 10 at 69 (McLachlin J.). 
brought about by an intended unlawful act. This addresses the moral luck element 
involved in the gap between the risk of bodily harm and the resultant death. The luck 
is extrinsic when the unlawful act is not inherently dangerous, but the foreseeable risk 
of injury, before the unlawful act is committed, renders it intrinsic to the unlawful act. It 
is arguable that an intended unlawful and dangerous act makes the luck inextricable. 
As long as the unlawful act is dangerous before it begins, the defendant has a fair 
opportunity to avoid committing an unlawful and dangerous act. If the defendant fails 
to take that opportunity it is appropriate and fair to convict of manslaughter for causing 
death by an intended unlawful act. This supports the change of normative position, but 
not by closing the gap between the risk of injury and the death caused. Moreover, 
raising the degree of harm risked to serious injury opens up questions about whether 
one-punch manslaughter would fall within manslaughter.97 
 Unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter could be defended if the Supreme 
Court interpreted the current law appropriately. Newbury and Jones could be seen as 
requiring an intended unlawful act, given that no crime was identified. It is this, or 
simply a voluntary act, that is most readily aligned with the judgment of the House of 
Lords and the latter does not make sense with the approval of Lamb. Furthermore, 
earlier case law suggests that an intended unlawful act is a tenable interpretation. The 
Larkin, Church, and Newbury and Jones line of cases could easily be viewed as 
requiring a likely risk of some harm. There is nothing in Newbury and Jones to suggest 
that, although the test of dangerousness is objective, it should not take account of 
those characteristics of the defendant that make it impossible to recognise the risk of 
injury. The idea that the foreseeable risk of injury need not be based on a specific 
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known circumstance is doubtful, because appellate decisions that the risk of injury 
could arise from the continuing circumstances of the unlawful act only gained 
momentum subsequent to Newbury and Jones. 
The controversy around unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter is 
misplaced. The debate regarding the change of normative position should not focus 
on the gap between the harm risked and harm caused, but on the foreseeable risk of 
injury from a specific circumstance known to the defendant before the unlawful act is 
committed with intent. The debate has not been addressed by the normative value of 
injuring with intent, or by the due notice of crossing the criminal threshold, but by a 
combination of them. The Supreme Court should interpret the law accordingly. 
